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IDEALISM IN YOGĀCĀRA BUDDHISM 
By Sean Butler 
Abstract.  In the last fifty years or so, since Yogācāra texts have been avail-
able to western academics, there has been a debate as to how Yogācāra Bud-
dhism should be interpreted.  This article seeks to establish that Yogācāra 
Buddhism is most properly interpreted as an idealist school of Buddhist 
thought.  Specifically, it challenges the arguments that have been put forth in 
recent years that suggest a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra Bud-
dhism.  The primary target of my argumentation is Dan Lusthaus but argu-
ments of other scholars are also taken into account.  In the process of defend-
ing my thesis I will explain the fundamentals of Yogācāra Buddhism, provide 
the reasons why Yogācāra Buddhism should be interpreted as an idealist 
school, provide reasons why some have interpreted Yogācāra Buddhism as 
phenomenology, refute non-idealist interpretations of Yogācāra Buddhism, 
and investigate the relation between Yogācāra Buddhism and other forms of 
idealism.  In order to achieve each of these goals I will utilize the original 
texts of Yogācāra Buddhism, known as the Trimsika, authored by Vasubandhu 
and the Cheng Wei-Shih Lun, authored by Hsüan-Tsang.  I will also reference 
and expound upon the philosophies of George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, and 
Georg Hegel along with recent scholars who have partaken in this debate. 
 
“All this is consciousness-only, because of the appearance of non-
existent objects, just as someone with an optical disorder may see non-
existent nets of hair.”1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Yogācāra Buddhism is often interpreted as an idealist school, a school of Buddhist 
thought that holds reality to be immaterial, or only mental2 This interpretation is 
sometimes disputed.  Here I will demonstrate that Yogācāra philosophy is most prop-
erly interpreted as idealism.  I will then address some non-idealist interpretations of 
Yogācāra, primarily, but not limited to, Dan Lusthaus’ claim that Yogācāra is phe-
nomenology, and demonstrate their failure.  Lastly I will briefly explore the similari-
ties and differences between Yogācāra and various forms of idealist philosophies. 
2. Yogācāra Buddhism 
Yogācāra Buddhism is an Indian Buddhist school “founded in the late fourth cen-
tury CE by Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu, as the second of the two major Ha-
hayana philosophical traditions.”3  “Yogācāra” is a composite term of “yoga,” or 
33                                        
1 Saam Trivedi, “Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism,” Asian Philosophy 15 (3): 235.  Trivedi is using   
Stefan Anacker’s translation of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, Verse 1. 
2Ibid., 231. 
The Hilltop Review, Spring 2010  
  
 
“discipline,” and “cara,” or “practice.”  Yogācāra Buddhism, then, is essentially Bud-
dhist practice of discipline.4  Like all Buddhist schools Yogācāra aims at the cessation 
of dukkha, loosely translated as suffering, which is realized at the attainment of 
enlightenment.  Because attachment is the cause of dukkha, and attachment is an ac-
tivity of the mind, Yogācārans involve themselves in an exploration of the mind.  The 
primary conclusions to which the Yogācārans arrive to explain the role of the mind 
are (1) everything is mind only; (2) that there is an ālayavijñāna, or store-house con-
sciousness, which allows for continuity of a “self” despite universal momentariness; 
(3) vasanas, or subliminal inclinations, act as karmic seeds that are stored in the 
ālayavijñāna; (4) the manas, or ego consciousness, influenced by the vasanas, color 
or “perfume” our perception of the world; (5) the perceived world is vijnana-
parinama, or a manifestation of the transforming of the consciousness; and (6) there 
are three forms of being, or svabhavas, the imagined, the dependent and the absolute.5  
These primary tenets of Yogācāra philosophy guide nearly all debate as to how 
Yogācāra is most properly interpreted, ie. whether or not Yogācāra Buddhism is ide-
alism. All Yogācārans will generally agree with these six conclusions.  There does 
exist disagreement internal to the Yogācāra school; for example, practitioners dis-
agree as to how one comes to escape from saṃsāra, or the cycle of re-birth and re-
death, how one gets rid of the vasanas in order to cease the production of karmic 
fruit, and whether or not the ālayavijñāna is overturned upon enlightenment.  But the 
disagreements that are internal to the Yogācāra school are not relevant to the task of 
this paper. 
3. Why Yogācāra Is Idealism6 
It is not uncommon to interpret Yogācāra as idealism.  Fernando Tola and Carmen 
Dragonetti, in their essay “Philosophy of Mind in the Yogācāra Buddhist Idealistic 
School,” take the Yogācāran understanding of svabhavas to profess idealism: 
two of these natures (the dependent and the imagined) constitute the empiri-
cal reality, and the third one, the Absolute.  To study these three natures is to 
study the empirical reality and the Absolute; to define the essence of these 
three natures is to define the essence of the empirical reality and of the Abso-
lute; and to establish the relation which links both of them, and to show the 
mechanism by means of which the imagined nature comes forth from the de-
pendent nature, is to show the process of how the empirical world is created 
from the mind…7 
Their analysis of the three forms of being seems to yield not only a mind-dependant 
world but also a mind-created world.  This conclusion is supported by Vasubandhu in 
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3 John M. Koller, Asian Philosopies (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 96. 
4 Ibid. 
5 For verification of these claims, see: Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), throughout. 
6 In this section I demonstrate the reasons why Yogācāra has been interpreted as Idealism and why such 
interpretations are reasonable.  Such interpretations, however, have been challenged in  recent years.  It 
is the overall aim of this paper, though not this particular section, to establish that new developments in 
interpreting Yogācāra fail to overcome idealistic interpretations.  
7 Fernando Tola & Carmen Dragonetti, “Philosophy of Mind in the Yogacara Buddhist Idealistic 
School,” History of Psychiatry, 16 (4): 454.                                                                                                                                 
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verse 17 of his Trimsika:  
 The transformation of consciousness is imagination.  What is imagined B y 
it does not exist.  Therefore everything is representation-only.8   
This is also illustrated in verse 18:  
 For consciousness is the seed of everything.  Transformation in such and such  
ways  
 Proceeds through mutual influence, so that such and such imagination is 
 born.9 
Further, verse 17 is reminiscent of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which claims that 
empirical perceptions are only appearances.10  Verse 18 more closely resembles 
Berkeley’s idealistic claim that the world is mind dependant.11  In either case it is 
hard to imagine that these claims are not idealistic.  Verse 17 explicitly categorizes all 
things as representations that are dependant on the imagination (a function of the 
mind) rather than the sensing of a real world.  Verse 18 clearly establishes conscious-
ness, or the mind, as the foundation for all things (including physical objects).  The 
clear reaction to Vasubandhu’s writings is, I think, the one that Paul Griffiths summa-
rizes well when he states, 
The cosmos, then, is straightforwardly said to be nothing more than mental 
events, and, as Vasubandhu points out, mental representations do not neces-
sarily (perhaps necessarily do not, though this interpretation is questionable) 
possess, or have as their intentional objects, physical objects external to the 
mind.12 
In Yogācāra Buddhism, priority is definitely given to the mind’s involvement in 
the world and, under some understandings of idealism, priority given to the mind is 
sufficient.  The Dictionary of Philosophy defines idealism as:  
[…] any system or doctrine whose fundamental interpretative principle is 
ideal. Broadly, any theoretical or practical view emphasizing mind (soul, 
spirit, life) or what is characteristically of pre-eminent value or significance 
to it. Negatively, the alternative to Materialism.13   
Other understandings of idealism differ.  For example, S. Trivedi distinguishes 
between three types of idealism (i) metaphysical idealism (the idealism put forward 
by George Berkeley), (ii) epistemic idealism (the idealism put forward by Emmanuel 
Kant), and (iii) absolute idealism (the idealism put forward by Georg Hegel).14  
Trivedi understands idealism in its Western sense by the philosophers who are called 
idealists, namely Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel.15  Because Trivedi’s understanding of 
Sean Butler                                                                                                                                                35                                
8 Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 291.  Dan Lusthaus 
uses Richard Robinson’s translation. 
9 Ibid., 292.  
10 Emmanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason, ed. trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 155. 
11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “George Berkeley,” WMU Library, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/berkeley/  
12 Paul Griffiths, “The Attainment of Cessation in the Yogacara Tradition,” in On Being Mindless: 
Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem, (La Salle: Open Court, 1986), 80. 
13 Dagobert D. Runes, The Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Citadel Press, 2001), 142. 
14 A discussion on the similarities and differences between the philosophies of Berkeley, Kant, and 
Hegel, would be far too technical and lengthy a process to undertake here.  Readers who are interested in 
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idealism is rooted in the systems of these Western philosophers, he concludes that 
Vasubandhu’s conclusions are not idealist conclusions.  However, there is no good 
reason to consider idealism only in its Western context.  Advaita philosophy, for ex-
ample, is idealism; and while this sort of idealism resembles more closely absolute 
idealism, it is not identical to Hegel’s philosophy and would therefore, according to 
Trivedi’s criteria, not be idealism.   
A criterion that idealism be rooted only in the philosophies of particular thinkers is 
an absurd criterion, for if it is the case that idealism is defined by similarity to idealist 
thinkers in history, then thinkers such as Kant, who is almost universally considered 
to be an idealist but whose philosophy was new and unique, would be excluded from 
the category simply because idealism existed before Kant did, thus excluding Kant’s 
new idealism.  In other words the category of idealism, according to Trivedi, is tem-
porally and culturally restricted, allowing for no new idealists in the future or outside 
of the Western tradition.  It is fair to question whether or not Yogācāra should be as-
sociated with the philosophies of idealists in the West, but not to question whether or 
not Yogācāra is idealism, for it resembles too closely those philosophies that are un-
questionably idealist and fits the criterion of giving priority to the mind. 
4. Arguments For A Non-Idealist Interpretation Of Yogācāra 
We have already partly explored one objection to Yogācāra as idealism.  It is ap-
propriate now to reinterpret Trivedi’s objection in its full context, as well as other 
objections to Yogācāra as idealism, such as that raised by Lusthaus. 
I have already established that Trivedi’s criterion for idealism is absurd, but his 
criterion is not at the heart of his argument.  Trivedi’s primary objection is that 
Vasubandhu’s position has been taken out of context and made to seem more like ide-
alism than it actually is.16  Trivedi suggests that Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra has been 
influenced by Tibetans.  When Buddhists were forced out of India by Islamic invad-
ers, Buddhism essentially left India and lost its historical and cultural context.  
Trivedi argues that this would be like studying Kant as though he were a Frenchman.  
We could not, he claims, do justice to Kant’s philosophy from this perspective.  Phi-
losophies, rather, must be understood contextually.17  
To reinforce his objection, Trivedi targets Garfield’s conclusions that Yogācāra is 
metaphysical idealism, instead suggesting that Yogācāra is phenomenology.  His po-
sition is based on the fact that Vasubandhu did not make any ontological claims.  
Trivedi’s argument resembles one of Dan Lusthaus’s arguments against the idealistic 
interpretation of Yogācāra.  Lusthaus quite plainly argues in favor of a phenomenalist 
interpretation of Yogācāra. Whereas Trivedi’s focus is solely on Vasubandhu, Lust-
haus’s arguments are inclusive of later Yogācārans.  He also makes the argument that 
idealism requires ontological commitments that Vasubandhu and other Yogācārans 
have demonstrably avoided.  Lusthaus takes Hsüan-Tsang’s Ch’eng wei-shih lun to 
make the epistemology of Yogācāra explicit: “remote alambana [objects] are 
‘external hyle [raw sense material].’”18  Lusthaus interprets this passage as a rejection 
of the knowable outside of raw sense material; he takes this to be evidence for Trivedi 
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15 Saam Trivedi, “Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism,” Asian Philosophy 15 (3): 231. 
16 Saam Trivedi, “Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism,” Asian Philosophy 15 (3): 244. 
17 Ibid. 
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and Lusthaus’s claim that the epistemic conclusions put forth by Yogācārans have 
been misinterpreted as ontological when they actually avoid ontological commit-
ments.19  Essentially the argument in favor of phenomenology is that the epistemic 
claims made by Yogācārans do not commit them to any ontological claims. 
Furthermore, Lusthaus sees another rejection of idealism in the Ch’eng wei-shih 
lun having to do with an externality to consciousness.  The Ch’eng wei-shih lun af-
firms the existence of other minds.  Lusthaus takes this to be fatal to the idealist inter-
pretation.  He states, “once and for all a very common misconception concerning 
Yogācāra as an idealism can be put to rest.  Yogācāra does not posit any single over-
arching ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ as the source or solitary existent of or in the 
world.”20  Lusthaus takes metaphysical idealism to be necessarily solipsistic and, if he 
is correct, then the Ch’eng wei-shih lun has indeed delivered the fatal blow to inter-
pretations of Yogācāra as an idealism.  The power of Lusthaus’s argument is best ex-
pressed in his own words: 
Nothing whatsoever, especially if it can be appropriated by conversation or 
cognition, can properly be said to be radically separate from consciousness.  
This does not entail the absurd consequence that my consciousness and my 
consciousness alone has thoroughly and utterly constructed the entire Lived-
world in which I locate myself as a self.  While there are things that operate 
in ways that are significantly independent of my consciousness, their inde-
pendence does not imply externality.  I perceive other minds as moved by 
wills and intents other than my own.  But I perceive them.  Does this non-
external “external” mind establish a perceptual pattern that might equally be 
applied to other things? […] If so, then all shreds of metaphysical idealism 
will have been precluded from the Yogācāra position.21 
The third and final argument Lusthaus offers against Yogācāra Buddhism being 
interpreted as idealism is that idealism commits itself to the mind, whereas Yogācāra 
seeks the mind’s destruction.  Recall that the aim of all Buddhist schools is the cessa-
tion of dukkha.  To accomplish this goal Yogācārans have explored the consciousness 
because of its direct involvement in causing dukkha.  Lusthaus offers two arguments: 
Yogācāra (yoga practice) doctrine received that name because it provided a 
“yoga,” a comprehensive, therapeutic framework for engaging in the prac-
tices that lead to the goal of the bodhisattva path, namely enlightened cogni-
tion.  Meditation served as the laboratory in which one could study how the 
mind operated.22 
And moreover, 
Consciousness (vijnana) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the 
root problem.  This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it 
can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end.23 
For dukkha to be overcome, the whole system of Yogācāra needs to be halted.  
Yogācāra explains how the mind operates in samsara, but this is precisely what is to 
18 Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 504. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 487. 
21 Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 491. 
22 Ibid., 533. 
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be avoided.  Yogācāra simply cannot be an idealism if its ultimate goal is to over-
come itself. 
The last objection which I will offer is that of John M. Koller.  Koller argues from 
the same position put forth by Lusthaus.  Yogācāra is not idealism, claims Koller, but 
rather a middle path between idealism and realism.24  Because Yogācārans acknowl-
edge that “there is a basis for the constructions of object and subject and that this ba-
sis can be known directly, they avoid the idealist error of claiming that persons and 
things exist only as ideas in the mind.”25  This is to say that Yogācārans understand 
that their efforts to understand the functioning of the mind are meant only to explain 
how dukkha arises from “selves” that exist outside of their idealistic structure.  In 
other words, there is a foundation in the world from which the Yogācāran system 
arises that is not contained within consciousness.  We can infer from this claim that 
upon reaching enlightenment, or the cessation of dukkha and therefore the cessation 
of the Yogācāran system, one will have attained an existence that is not described by 
Yogācāra, one that is not involved in the conditioning of the world by the conscious-
ness. 
5. Refuting Non-Idealist Interpretations Of Yogācāra 
Here I will argue that, though the above objections to interpreting Yogācāra as ide-
alism may sound convincing, they are flawed.  I will address each of the objections 
outlined above.  Additionally, although some of the above arguments are interrelated, 
I will do my best to address them each individually. 
Trivedi has argued that an idealist interpretation of Yogācāra fails to recognize the 
context in which Yogācāra was first put forth by Vasubandhu.  He claimed that 
Yogācāra has been inappropriately colored by a context of which it is not a part.  He 
claimed that Western and Tibetan interpretations are flawed in the same way that un-
derstanding Kant in the context of the French existentialists would be.26  While it is 
true that context is valuable in understanding historical philosophy, Trivedi seems to 
give it too much weight.  Studying Kant in a French context would surely change the 
way we view his philosophy, but not to the extent that we would no longer call him a 
transcendental idealist.  Kant would still have a categorical imperative.  We would 
surely be able to recognize his arguments for the world of appearances and the a pri-
ori cause to believe in a world beyond our appearances.  I concede that certain aspects 
of how Kant is understood might change; for example, we might not recognize him as 
being the inspiration for Fichte, but those claims that are internal to Kant would re-
main untouched so long as the translations represented them accurately.  Furthermore, 
Yogācāra has been viewed in its historical and cultural context and is still understood 
as idealistic.  Karl H. Potter, in his book Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, in-
vestigated the various schools of thought in India and their relations to each other.  
Yogācāra, Potter reports, is an idealist Buddhist school influenced by Advaita and 
Madhyamika, among others.  Trivedi argues that we have misunderstood Yogācāra.  
It seems obvious that, if he is correct, it is not simply because of the context in which 
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we study it. 
The second objection Trivedi puts forth is the same as that of Lusthaus; Yogācāra, 
they argue, is not idealism but phenomenology.  First of all, there is nothing inherent 
in phenomenology that precludes idealism.  Usually phenomenology is distinguished 
from idealism in that it deals only with what is presented to the mind and makes no 
ontological commitments, however, the lack of ontological commitments does not 
preclude idealism. Trivedi and Lusthaus are right to acknowledge the phenomenologi-
cal aspects of Yogācāra, but are incorrect in believing that Yogācāra is only phe-
nomenology.  The doctrine of cittmata, or “all is mind only,” is read in two ways.  
First, it can be read as the ontological claim that all existing objects are mind-
dependant, the one that Griffiths takes to be blatantly idealistic.  It holds that the en-
tire cosmos to be composed of mind “stuff” and nothing else.  The second way to in-
terpret cittmata, the interpretation that Lusthaus and Trivedi favor, is that conscious-
ness cannot transcend itself, that all events that are brought before the mind involve 
the mind’s participation.  This second interpretation makes no claim outside of what 
is brought before the mind and is therefore phenomenological.  I argue that these two 
claims are not mutually exclusive.  If we are to assume there is something other than 
mind then the second interpretation precludes the first, however, if there is only mind, 
then there is nothing beyond phenomenology to make claims about, and phenomenol-
ogy becomes idealism.  For this reason it would be premature to take cittmata as ei-
ther an idealistic or a phenomenological claim in and of itself.  Whether or not citt-
mata is a doctrine of idealism or phenomenology hinges on whether or not there is 
anything other than mind. 
The task of discovering whether or not there is anything other than mind is a diffi-
cult one because Yogācārans do not talk about anything outside of the mind.  In fact, 
anything outside of the mind must be considered to be “unreal,” because in order for 
anything to be outside of the mind there must be unconditioned dharmas; however, 
dharmas are by definition conditioned, thus unconditioned dharmas are unreal.27  If 
anything outside of the mind is “unreal” then what is real is mind-only.  This conclu-
sion agrees with both the idealist and the phenomenalist interpretation of cittmata.   
To make the point clear let us look at how a Western idealist approaches the issue.  
George Berkeley has an argument that commits the phenomenological conclusion to 
idealism.  Berkeley first establishes a mind-only principle and concludes from this 
principle the impossibility of objects outside of a mind: 
That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, 
exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow.  And it seems no less 
evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however 
blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot 
exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.  I think an intuitive knowl-
edge may be obtained of this, by anyone that shall attend to what is meant by 
the term exist when applied to sensible things.  The table I write on, I say, 
exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it 
existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that 
some other spirit actually does perceive it. […] For as to what is said of the 
  27 Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 528-9. 
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absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being 
perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible.  Their esse is percipi, nor is it 
possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things 
which perceive them.28 
The power of Berkeley’s argument lies in the necessity of one’s cognitive involve-
ment in the world; this Lusthaus admits to.  When considered linguistically, or what 
we mean when we say X, the phenomenological interpretation of cittmata commits 
one to the idealist claim.  What is meant by ontology is that which is, was, or will be 
presented to the mind.  Thus phenomenal claims are ontological claims; this logically 
follows from the recognition that the mind cannot escape itself.  So we see that 
though Yogācārans have not explicitly made this argument, the positions to which 
they adhere commit them to the ontological interpretation of cittmata.  With the onto-
logical claim established, we see that Trivedi, Lusthaus and any others who interpret 
Yogācāra as phenomenology may do so, so long as they do not mistakenly take this to 
mean that Yogācāra is not also idealism. 
Having established the failure of the argument for a phenomenology that precludes 
idealism, I would like to take this opportunity to comment on how it is that Lusthaus 
in particular came to reject idealism.  Lusthaus seeks to reject idealism is because he 
finds it repugnant; Lusthaus believes that idealism necessitates solipsism.  Recall that 
Lusthaus claims that the recognition of other minds in the Ch’eng wei-shih lun “does 
not entail the absurd consequence that my consciousness and my consciousness alone 
has thoroughly and utterly constructed the entire Lived-world in which I locate my-
self as a self.”29  It is common for idealism to be misinterpreted as solipsism, espe-
cially the metaphysical idealism of Berkeley which we have likened to Yogācāra.  
Berkeley has often been interpreted as a solipsist because of his tenet “esse is per-
cipi.”  Certainly the claim that “to be is to be perceived,” from the perspective of the 
individual, yields a sort of phenomenological solipsism, however, Berkeley’s full 
claim is not expressed in this tenet.  The full claim is “esse is percipi aut percipere,” 
or “to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver.”  Because Berkeley is a metaphysical 
idealist, and not a solipsist, we can conclude that metaphysical idealism does not re-
quire solipsism.  Lusthaus is simply wrong to think that the existence of other minds 
entails the rejection of idealism.  Furthermore, the absolute idealism of Hegel requires 
other minds, so even if Berkeley were a solipsist, the existence of other minds would 
not preclude every type of idealism. 
A second misunderstanding of idealism that is common amongst those (Lusthaus 
included) who find it repugnant is that idealism entails a rejection of the reality of the 
world.  It is easy to see how one would come to this conclusion.  When the waking 
world is equated with the dreaming world, as is done explicitly in Yogācāra and is 
suggested by other idealisms, one could easily take this to entail that the unreality of 
the dreaming world is now the unreality of the waking world.  This is no more correct 
than a materialist concluding that the material reality of the waking world entails the 
material reality of the dreaming world.  Idealism does not claim that the world does 
not exist; idealism claims that materialists misinterpret existence to require material-
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ity.  The world still exists for the idealist, just not materially.  I take Lusthaus to be a 
victim to this misunderstanding when he says, “If they [Yogācārans] are not idealists, 
what are they?  What do they posit as real, if anything?”30  If this misunderstanding is 
corrected I think that scholars like Lusthaus and Trivedi would not be so eager to re-
ject an idealist interpretation of Yogācāra. 
That being said, Koller’s objection is now much easier to address.  If the phenome-
nological interpretation of Yogācāra is really an idealistic interpretation, then what is 
left to address about Koller’s objection is the idealistic mistake “that persons and 
things exist only as ideas in the mind.”31  Koller maintains that the foundation for 
cognition precludes the possibility of persons and things existing only as ideas.  This 
objection carries weight against the absolute idealism of Hegel but fails to properly 
understand the idealism of Kant or Berkeley.  Kant’s transcendental idealism does not 
preclude a foundational existence; in fact it embraces the foundation and calls it 
noumena.  Berkeley also recognizes the foundation of thought as being something 
other than ideas.  Berkeley claims that there are not just ideas, but also minds or spir-
its that perceive the ideas (which are not ideas themselves).  It seems that Koller is 
simply mistaken to think that idealists, or at least idealists other than Hegel, treat per-
ceivers as ideas in the mind. 
I have now shown that the compelling arguments offered by Lusthaus, Trivedi, and 
Koller ultimately fail and the interpretation of Yogācāra as anything but idealism ei-
ther fails to understand idealism or mistakes phenomenology as necessarily excluding 
idealism.  I will now move to a discussion on the similarities and differences between 
Yogācāra and various kinds of idealism. 
6. What Sort Of Idealism Is Yogācāra? 
Having established that Yogācāra is in fact idealism, it is now appropriate to inves-
tigate the question: what sort of idealism is Yogācāra?  It is not necessary for 
Yogācāra to fit Western models of idealism, but it will be useful to see in what ways 
Yogācāra parallels each of these.  Of course a sufficiently thorough investigation is 
too large a task to undertake here, but establishing some similarities and differences 
will prove useful. 
We can eliminate an interpretation of Yogācāra as absolute idealism up front.  Ab-
solute idealism, the idealism of Hegel, is unique to a particular method.  Hegel uses a 
dialectical method or logic that is nowhere to be found in the Yogācāra tradition.  
Furthermore, in the absence of this method, Koller’s objection outlined above sug-
gests that a view of idea-only is not compatible with the Yogācāran requirement for a 
foundation from which the consciousness can operate.  There is, however, one impor-
tant similarity between Yogācāra and absolute idealism: the concept of the self.  Be-
ing a Buddhist school requires that Yogācārans maintain a denial of a distinct self.  In 
Hegel’s philosophy there is a self that is created through the recognition of the other.  
The process for the creation of the “self” in Hegel’s philosophy closely resembles the 
interdependence of the “self” in Buddhism.  In Buddhism it is not so much a denial of 
the self but rather a denial of an individually existing and independent self.  Hegel’s 
30 Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 6. 
31 John M. Koller, Asian Philosophies (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 102. 
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self is similarly not distinct but dependant upon its involvement in the world. 
The next two idealisms to which I will compare Yogācāra are the epistemic ideal-
ism of Kant and the metaphysical idealism of Berkeley.  Yogācāra shares a great deal 
of similarity with both of these forms of idealism.  The vasanas or “perfumings” in 
Yogācāra are reminiscent of Kant’s categories.  For Kant there is a structure in each 
of us, a way in which we must perceive the world.  This structure determines how we 
perceive the world.  For example, Kant challenges the reality of absolute space and 
time and reduces them to a sort of rational set of goggles that each of us wears which 
forces the world of appearances into a structure of time and space.  This is similar to 
Yogācāra in that, within that philosophy, our karmic seeds or vasanas determine how 
the world is presented to us.  Also, according to Kant’s idealism, the perceived world 
is really just the mind in much the same way that Yogācārans use a mirror analogy to 
express the seeming externality of the world which, for them, is really internal.  An-
other analogy that can be drawn is that freedom from samsara in Yogācāra, seen 
through Kant’s eyes, would be an attempt at recognizing the world in itself, what 
Kant would call the noumenal world.  Kant prescribes a priori reason as the vehicle 
to the noumenal world, whereas Yogācārans believe that through a thorough investi-
gation into the world of appearances, one can learn how to differentiate or stop one’s 
attachment to appearances and come to know ultimate reality.  In both philosophies 
the ultimate reality is beyond the mind’s grasp but is nevertheless accepted as real.  
Yogācāra parts paths with epistemic idealism when it comes to their respective views 
of the self.  Whereas Yogācārans’ view of the self more closely resembles absolute 
idealism, epistemic idealism presumes a distinct self.  There are other places in which 
these philosophies fail to meet, but it is sufficient to establish that Yogācāra cannot be 
epistemic idealism due to the different notions of the self. 
Metaphysical idealism and Yogācāra will also part paths in their understanding of 
the self.  For this reason, Yogācāra cannot be equated with metaphysical idealism, 
though we should also acknowledge where these two philosophies concur.  Meta-
physical idealism and Yogācāra agree that the “self” experiences the world as mind-
only.  The objects of consciousness according to both philosophies are mental events.  
Berkeley maintains that these mental events are ideas, whereas Yogācārans maintain 
a less strict and slightly more complex explanation for the objects of perception.  
Berkeley will also diverge from Yogācāra in the understanding of particulars.  The 
Yogācārans adhere to the Buddhist doctrine of interdependent arising, which requires 
a more interconnected explanation with regard to any particular.  Berkeley, on the 
other hand, maintains particulars in the form of minima sensibilia, or the minimal ob-
ject of sense, which act as the building blocks for the whole phenomenal world.  
Yogācāra has some vital commonalities with metaphysical idealism, but alas, they do 
not completely coincide. 
7. Conclusion 
The congruences and departures between Yogācāra and idealism are vast in num-
ber.  Though I have not been able to explore the issue thoroughly here, what is impor-
tant to note is that Yogācāra, though similar in many regards with idealisms in the 
West, must be viewed as its own form of idealism.  That it is idealism can no longer 
be denied, yet it obviously does not fit into our traditional Western models.  This 
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should not, as Trivedi has suggested, exclude Yogācāra from the category of idealism, 
but instead be an impetus for change in the Western understanding of the term. 
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